Appraising workfare programs by Ravallion, Martin
_____________  SpS  I q~5s
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1955
Appraising  Workfare  Simple  analytical  tools  can
help  appraise  workfare
Programs  programs  when data  and
time are scarce.  They  can  also
Martin Ravallion  help  design  better  programs.
The World Bank
Development Research Group

















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1955
Summary findings
Workfar  e programs aim to reduce poverty by providing  severe drought). The sole objective of both programs is
lowv-wage  work for those who need it. They are often  to reduce poverty.
turned to in a crisis when there is too little time for a  By rough calculations, the cost of a $  gain to the poor
rigorous evaluation. They are also relatively complex  is S2.50 in both cases, though the same gain in current
programs, and difficult to evaluate,  earnings would cost 50 to 100 percent  more.
Ravallion offers some simple analytical tools for  Benefits to the poor  could be greatly enhanced by
rapidly appraising workfare programs. For pedagogic  design changes - for example, switching to more labor-
purposes, the two programs are stylized versions of a  intensive production  methods for subprojects (in the
range of programs found in actual practice. One is for a  middle-income country); enhancing the indirect benefits
middle-income country (in which unemployment has  within poor communities from the assets created; or
risen sharply in the wake of macroeconomic stabilization  striving for greater cost recovery from the nonpoor.
and reform), the other for a low-income country (hit by
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Savedoff, K. Subbarao, Dominique van de Walle, Michael Walton, Ann Velenchik, and  participants at
two seminars at the World Bank.Workfare programs, whereby participants must work to obtain benefits, have been widely
used for fighting poverty.'  They are often turned to in crises such as due to macroeconomic or agro-
climatic shocks, in which a large number of poor able-bodied people have become unemployed. 2
They are also relatively complex programs, and so difficult to evaluate. Other things being equal,
one  would prefer the appraisal and design of such schemes to be well informed and rigorous.
However, time is short in a crisis, and data are often far less than ideal. What can be done to obtain
a reasonably credible and yet rapid assessment of the likely gains to the poor from a given outlay on
such an a workfare program?
This article offers a "mini-manual"  for the rapid appraisal of an existing workfare program.
By "rapid appraisal" I mean that the work can be done in the field in about two person weeks with
the sort of data normally (though not invariably) available at short notice. Box 1 summarizes the data
requirements.  I assume that the government and/or aid donor wants the rapid appraisal to address
two main questions: How much impact on poverty can be expected if the existing scheme were
expanded?  How might the existing scheme be modified to enhance its impact on poverty?
To make the discussion more concrete,  I shall consider two specific programs, each stylized
versions  of  those  found  in  practice.  One  of  them is  in  a  middle-income  country in  which
unemployment has risen sharply in the wake of a macroeconomic stabilization and reform program,
while  the other  is a low-income country hit by a severe drought.  I will label the former country
MINC (for "middle income") and the latter LINC ("low  income"). The program is called "Trabajar". 3
l  On the arguments  for this type of intervention  see Ravallion  (1991a),  Besley and Coate (1992),
Lipton  and Ravallion  (1995, section  6), Mukherjee  (1997),  and Subbarao  (1997).
2  Transfers  to the non-able  bodied  poor will also be needed  for a comprehensive  safety  net. On
the potential  complementarities  between  workfare  programs  and other safety-net  interventions  see Dreze
and Sen (1989).
3 This is also the name of a program  in Argentina,  and I will draw on data from that country  to
illustrate some points. However,  I have  deliberately  altered  some  features  of the Argentinean  scheme  to
build in some features  of schemes  found elsewhere.  The  LINC scheme  is modeled  on the schemes
commonly  found in South  Asia including  the Employment  Guarantee  Scheme  in the state of Maharashtra
in India.
2Box 1: Data  for a rapid  appraisal
The rapid appraisal method proposed here requires information on the poverty rate
in the relevant country or region, the wage rate of unskilled (informal sector) labor,
the unemployment rate amongst the poor (preferably on a time basis, rather than
usual  status), the labor intensity of the current workfare projects, their (financial)
benefit-cost-ratio, their cost-recovery rate, and the extent to which the projects are
targeted to poor areas. The likely sources of this information are household or labor
force surveys, the project's administrators (both central and local), and interviews
with participants in the program.
It  is not normally  feasible for a rapid appraisal to quantify the distribution of benefits
amongst the poor, and so only the aggregate transfer to the poor from the budget is estimated here.
However, I will note some of the qualitative ways in which sensitivity to distribution amongst the
poor (such as putting higher weight on gains to the poorest) can have bearing on the appraisal and
design of the program. I will also note the implications of a high discount rate, such that a low value
is attached to reducing poverty in terms of future incomes.
The available budget is taken to be predetermined.  The issues are then how cost-effective
the workfare program is in  raising incomes of the poor, and how performance might be improved.
Such "cost-effectiveness" calculations can be deceptive if the budget is not exogenous. This can
happen if program design also influences the resources available, such as by influencing how
generous the non-poor are in supporting the program. For example, external benefits to non-poor
from the assets created could help mobilize public support for the program, and so boost overall
funding; a lower share of the public spending may still mean a higher total transfer to the poor once
these effects are factored in.4 Such effects can be difficult to predict, and may well be of little
importance in a crisis, though they may be important to the longer-term sustainability of safety net
policies. 5 I will return to this point.
4  For example,  insurance  benefits  to non-poor  participants  were a factor  in mobilizing  public
support  in rural areas  for workfare  schemes  in South  Asia; see Ravallion  (199la).
5  An example  is the Sri Lankan  food stamp  scheme  in which a better targeted  program  (with the
poor getting a higher  share of the budget)  was introduced,  but this subsequently  undermined  political
support  from the middle class, such that the poor ended  up with less than before  the reforms.  For further
3In common with other estimates of cost-effectiveness,  I shall also largely ignore risk benefits.
This could well be the most serious limitation of the calculations reported here, since insurance
against income losses is thought to be a significant benefit from workfare programs in practice
(Ravallion, 1991  a).  I will comment on what biases this might impart.
Any public  program must be assessed relative to  the best alternative use of the same
resources. This will vary with county circumstances, including administrative capabilities.  One
option which would probably be feasible everywhere is a uniform allocation of the same budget, in
which every household (whether poor or not) gets the same amount. Assuming that this is feasible,
a workfare scheme aiming to reduce poverty should not be supported if the total gain to the poor as
a proportion of the budget is less than the percentage of households who are poor.  Of course, a
workfare scheme which passed this test may still be inferior to some other option; in more developed
economies and some transition economies, for example, a well-designed unemployment insurance
scheme may well be a more cost-effective option to workfare (Wilson and Fretwell, 1996).
The article begins with a description of the stylized programs. It then discusses how their
cost-effectiveness  might be assessed. This will also suggest ways in which benefits to the poor might
be increased.
An overview of the programs
There are two ways in which a workfare program might reduce poverty: the first is by
providing paid work for the unemployed from poor households, and the second is by producing
things of value to poor families. Workfare will naturally be more labor intensive than a program
which simply maximized the present value of the assets created, because the workfare program
attaches positive value to employment of poor people, independently of the gains to society as a
whole from the outputs obtained from that employment. So a workfare program will tend to operate
at a point where there is a trade-off between the value of the assets created and employment.
Figure  1 illustrates this trade off. The program will operate to the right of the point which
maximizes the present value of the assets created. One can think of the latter as the "unweighted
discussion  of these and other issues  of targeting  see Besley  and Kanbur  (1993) and van de Walle (1998).
4optimum", recognizing that there will be some distribution-weighted  measure of social benefits from
the assets created, allowing for a shadow wage rate below the market wage (reflecting the existence
of unemployment), which will lead to the same design choices as a poverty-focused workfare
program.
Figure 1: The  trade-off in a workfare program
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This trade-off poses one of the more difficult design issues for a workfare program: How
much emphasis should be given to immediate employment versus creating durable assets?  The
program in MINC puts relatively more emphasis on the assets created than does the LINC scheme.
Municipal  governments in MINC appear to use the scheme as an extra source of funds for the
maintenance or up-grading of minor roads, sanitation facilities and so on, using  roughly the same
technology (combination of labor and non-labor inputs) as would be done otherwise.  For example,
a number of sub-projects in MINC entailed connecting new dwellings under construction - clearly
for well-to-do households - to the sewerage system.  In others, pavements were being repaired in
well-to-do  neighborhoods. In LINC, the projects are mainly minor roads, soil conservation, re-
forestation and irrigation, and the technology tends to be highly labor intensive - somewhat more
so than for similar projects outside the workfare program.
In neither country is the present target group for selecting  projects poor communities per se.
5In  MINC  the projects  are just  as  likely to  be  in non-poor neighborhoods,  and  in  LINC the
beneficiaries from the rural development projects are often relatively well-off local landowners. In
both cases, the work done clearly has some value to the community at large, though it would seem
unlikely that the projects in LINC would pass a conventional cost-benefit  test. Cofinancing to cover
the non-wage cost is usually provided by the municipal or provincial government; it is unusual for
local residents or non-governmental organizations  to provide cofinance. Cost recovery is rare, even
from well-off beneficiaries from the assets created.
The arithmetic of cost-effectiveness
To estimate  the share of the government's  outlay which benefits the poor  - the  'cost-
effectiveness ratio" - it can help to decompose the ratio into various components which can either
be estimated from the data available, or can be calibrated from seemingly plausible assumptions.
Here I suggest one possible decomposition, though there are other possibilities; my aim is only to
provide an example of the method which might easily be adapted to specific circumstances.
The proportion of the total public expenditure on the program (by both the MOL and co-
financing by local government) which is accountable to the net income gain to poor workers can be
decomposed into the following five variables:
(i) The budget leverage. The government can require co-financing for sub-projects from
benefitting neighborhoods in which there are very few poor people.  Let the governmental (central
plus local) spending be G, and let this be leveraged up to result in a total budget of G+C, including
the private co-financing (C).
(ii) The labor intensity. Some of the participants may not be poor; so let the share of all
wages paid in total operating cost be (W+L)/(G+C), where W is the wage received by the poor and
L denotes leakage to the non-poor.
(iii) The targeting performance. This is given by the proportion of the wages paid out which
goes to poor workers, W/(W+L).
(iv) The net wage gain. This is the share of the gross wage received by the poor which is left
after subtracting all costs to them of participating, including any forgone income; it is NW/W where
NW stands for net wage.
6(v) The indirect benefit. IB/NW where IB are indirect benefits to the poor, such as when the
assets created are in poor neighborhoods.
The net gain to poor workers as a proportion of public spending on the program, namely BIG,
is then given by:
B  G+C  W+L  W  NW  IB
G  G  G +C  W+L  W  (  NW'  (1)
(i)  (ii  OHi)  (iv)  (v)
It is useful to also decompose the last ratio as:
IB  _  IB  SB  NW
NW  SBKG+C  G+C  (2)
(vi)  (vii)  (viii)
which gives IB/NW as the product of a further three ratios:
(vi) Poor peoples' share of the social benefits from the assets created by the project; this is
given by the ratio of the indirect benefits to the poor (IB) to the social benefits (SB), where the latter
are assessed without distributional weights.
(vii) The benefit-to-cost ratio for the project; the ratio of SB to cost, G+C.
(iii) The inverse of the share of net wage gains to total cost.  This can also be written in terms
of three of the ratios in equation (1) above, namely:
NW  NW  W  W+L
G +C  W  W+L  G +C  (3)
(iv)  (iii  (ii)
in which the labels (iv, iii, and ii) correspond to the ratios from equation (1).
Some of these benefits accrue in the future; this is likely to be true of the bulk of the indirect
benefits from the assets created. One can also define the ratio of current benefits (CB) to government
spending by replacing all values in these formulae by current values, or values within some specified
period. I will take that to be the period in which Trabajar wage earnings are received  and assume
7that IB=O  for that period for estimating CB.
In the above formulation, cost-recovery from the non-poor will increase the budget leverage
ratio, (G+C)/G, but not change other variables. We can explicitly introduce the cost recovery rate,
k = C/(SB-JB)  i.e., the ratio of the privately financed component of the total cost to the amount of
the total  benefit which does not accrue to the poor. One can then readily obtain the following
formula for the budget leverage ratio:
G+C  lB  SB  1
G  =  [1 - k.(1 -- S)*  G+  (4
(vi)  (vii)
in which the labels (vi-and vii) correspond to the ratios from equation (2).
The following sections  will discuss data and a priori reasoning which can help in determining
seemingly plausible values for these ratios.
Impact on labor earnings
In discussing how plausible values for the cost-effectiveness  ratio might be estimated, I will
focus initially on the workfare scheme in MINC. Once the basic ideas are in place, the application
to LINC will be straightforward.
There is a strong association between poverty and unemployment in MINC.  Tabulations
were provided by the MINC Statistical Bureau (MSB), from a national sample survey done six
months  earlier.  The results  indicated an unemployment rate of 40% in the poorest  decile of
households ranked by income per person, as compared to 20% for all households. Unemployment
rates in MINC fall steadily as income per person rises; for example, for households living at 1.25
times the poverty line the unemployment rate is 10% - high, but well below the rate for the poor.
The wage rate
As is typically the case in workfare programs, no means test is applied in MINC's scheme.
Provided the wage rate is low enough it will self-select poor participants while not undermining their
incentive to take up other jobs when available.  A low wage rate will also help assure a good
distribution  of benefits amongst the poor (Ravallion, 1991b). (It should not be forgotten that the
8scheme has a budget constraint; one would like to increase the wage rate of poor workers, but this
will mean that fewer poor people benefit from the program.) By reducing the need for rationing of
Trabajar jobs,  a relatively low wage rate will also enhance the risk benefits from the program, by
providing a reliable fall back at times of need. 6
So it is important that the appraisal determines if the current wage rate under the program is
likely to be attractive to people who are not in the target group, or discourage participating workers
from taking up regular jobs when available. If the scheme is to avoid attracting people out of other
full time employment then the wage rate should not be higher than the prevailing wage for similar
work.
The current statutory minimum wage rate in MINC is $250 per month, above the current
wage rate on the program of $200. (The program is given an exemption from the statutory minimum
wage rate given that it is an emergency employment program targeted to the poor).  However, the
statutory minimum wage rate may also be above the market wage rate, given that enforcement of the
minimum wage rate is difficult in MINC, as in most developing countries. So how does the Trabajar
wage rate compare to market wages received by the poor?
Let us focus on the poorest 10% of households (ranked by total income per person).  The
MSB provided data on this group, based on a recent survey.  The average monthly earnings for the
principal job (when this entails at least 35 hours of work per week) were calculated to be $330. This
is well above the wage rate under the Trabajar program.  The poorest decile received the lowest
average wage. Figure 2 gives average monthly wages for full-time work by decile. (These are data
for Argentina, from a household survey done in May 1996 by the government's statistics office.)
On the basis of these data, it is reasonable to assume that the prevailing wage rate under the
program is unlikely to be attractive to anyone who is not considered poor in MINC, and they are
unlikely to attract poor employed workers out of their current job.
6  For further  discussion  and references  see Ravallion  (1991  a). For an example  of the rationing
that can result from too high a wage rate see Ravallion et al. (1993).
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Net wage gain
The net wage  ratio (NW/W)  is probably  the most difficult  component  to estimate  in equation
(1) and (possibly  for this reason)  it is often  set to unity. This would  be justified if labor supply  to a
workfare  scheme  comes only from unemployment  and  no other  participation  costs are incurred  by
the poor. But this is difficult  to accept.  Even  if all workers  were  unemployed  at  the time they  joined
the scheme, that does not mean that they would  have remained  unemployed  had the scheme  not
existed.  Even a worker who has been unemployed  for some time will typically  face a positive
probability  of finding  extra  work  during  any period  of search,  including  (of course)  self-employment
or some informal  sector activity. Joining the program  will leave  less time for search. So the net
income gain  will be lower  than the gross  wage  rate  paid. How much lower?
Consider  a typical  unemployed  poor worker  who is searching  for work at the beginning  of
the period of time in which  the Trabajar  program  will be open.  Without  the program,  the worker
faces  a probability  P*  of finding  extra  work of some  sort in that period,  at a wage W.  So expected
earnings  without  Trabajar  are  P*W. (One  can interpret  P*  as the proportion  of time in which work
is found during  the period.)
Now introduce  the workfare  program.  Let the probability  of finding  extra  non-Trabajar  work
10while working on the program be P (which may not be the same as P* ). The Trabajar wage is W.
The expected income gain when Trabajar becomes available is then PW  + (I-P)W.  So the expected
net wage gain (NW) to  workers from introducing the scheme is:
NW=  (1-P)W-  (P*-P)  W`  (5)
Suppose, for example, that joining the scheme means that the worker can no longer search
for a regular  job, and hence has zero chance of getting one (P=O). Then the expected gain is W - P
WO  i.e., the Trabajar wage minus expected earnings from searching for a regular job.  However, this
example does not seem plausible in this setting. The worker can still search in non-work hours and
working on Trabajar may help in getting a regular job (by the extra experience, and possibly the
extra knowledge  of work opportunities) sufficient to compensate for the lost search time.  So
suppose instead that joining  the scheme has no effect one way or the other; P* =P.  Then the
expected gain is the proportion of the worker's time that would otherwise be unemployed, times the
wage rate.
In one special case, the calculation of net wage gain simplifies greatly. This is when no extra
non-Trabajar employment is available to the poor with or without the program i.e., P* =P = 0. Then
any income forgone by a Trabajar participant will be made up by an equal gain to a poor non-
participant.  Employment for the poor is than a zero-sum game. Since there will be no income
forgone to poor workers as a whole, we then have NW/W=l. It appears that this special case of zero
foregone income appears is often (at least implicitly) assumed in discussions of workfare schemes.
But it is hard to see how it could be considered plausible on a priori grounds, as discussed above.
What are seemingly plausible assumptions for MINC?  As noted above, there is a high rate
of unemployment amongst the poor in MINC, with the MSB survey indicating that 40% of those in
the poorest decile were unemployed.  Consider a worker in the poorest decile who is choosing
between the Trabajar Program and the labor market. If he does not accept a Trabajar job then some
work will no doubt be found. Suppose that he has the average probability of being employed at the
average wage received by workers in that decile. Then he will be employed 60% of the time at a rate
of $330.  His expected wage if he does not accept employment on the scheme is then about $200.
11So the average Trabajar wage rate is the minimum expected wage needed to attract the average
worker in the poorest decile out of unemployment.
This calculation is based on averages.  There will be a distribution around these averages;
some workers will face relatively low chances of finding a full time job, and probably also of finding
even casual part time work while searching for a full time job.  Such workers will of course find the
Trabajar wage rate more attractive. There are also regional differences; the same wage will be
relatively more (less) attractive in low- (high-) cost regions, and there will be regional differences
in unemployment rates. The gains will be found amongst those who face below average prospects
of other employment, and/or below average wage rates, or who live in areas where the cost of living
is relatively low.
With such a high average unemployment rate in the poorest deciles, it is not unreasonable
to presume that participants face unusually low prospects of finding full time work during their spell
of Trabajar employment. How much lower is hard to say. Let us assume that Trabajar participants
face a 50% higher rate of unemployment than found amongst the poorest decile, implying a high
unemployment rate, so P=0.4.  I also assume that joining Trabajar has no effect on the probability
of finding a regular job.  So the expected net benefit for those joining the MINC scheme will be 60%
of the Trabajar wage rate.
Cost-effectiveness of MINC's program
Since there is negligible private co-financing, I set C=0.  MOL's accounts for the project
indicate that their own contributions (entirely for Trabajar workers) accounted for one third of total
cost, so (W+L)/(G+C)=I/3. Given the above assessment of the wage rate in the MINC scheme it is
unlikely that it would be attractive to people who are not poor there.  So I set L=O. From the data
and  assumptions  discussed  in the previous section, I have assumed that NW/W  = 0.6.  Then
NWI(G+C) = 0.2.
My assumption  that there is no leakage to the non-poor in the MINC scheme deserves
comment.  Survey evidence on these schemes invariably indicates that there are beneficiaries who
do not have an income or expenditure below the poverty line (see, for example, the estimates quoted
in Subbarao  et al., 1997).  In part this may be reflect a relatively high wage rate on the scheme.
12However, it must also be acknowledged that the welfare indicator being used is rather crude for that
purpose.  It is typically being based on a household income or expenditure aggregate which is
measured with error, is normalized by equivalence scales and cost-of-living indices also measured
with error, and is averaged over a period of time which might vary from a month to a year or longer
and may well be longer than the period over which poverty is experienced. For all these reasons, it
will be a noisy indicator of current living standards. Compared to such data (though possibly fine
for other purposes, including aggregate poverty measurement), one might interpret willingness to
work at a low wage rate, such as the Trabajar wage in MINC,  as a better indicator of poverty.
Turning to the indirect benefits, since there is no explicit attempt to target poor areas in
MINC, I assume that the poor are equally likely to benefit from the projects; so IB/SB=0.2.  The
projects in MINC produce benefits sufficient to cover their cost; SBI(G+C)=1.  (This reflects the fact
that the labor intensity is about the average for similar public works projects.) Combining these
assumptions, we find that BINW=2. Later I will consider alternative assumptions.
Combining these numbers, the value of B/G implied by equation (1) is 0.40, Equivalently,
it takes $2.50 to increase incomes of the poor by $1. Assuming that all of the indirect benefit is in
the future, the CB/G ratio is 0.20, so it takes $5 to transfer $1 to the poor today.
So the B/G estimate turns out to be about double MINC's overall poverty rate of 20%.  The
latter number is also the share that poor people would obtain from a uniform, un-targeted, allocation
of the same budget across the whole population (such that everyone gets about the same amount,
whether poor or not). So the present workfare scheme in MINC would do better that this alternative
policy,  though there may still be some alternative targeting scheme which could make up this
difference. However, in terms its impact on the current incomes of the poor, the workfare scheme
does no better or worse than a uniform lump-sum transfer to all households, whether poor or not.
LINC's workfare program
The  LINC  scheme  operates  primarily  in  rural  areas.  Unlike  in  MINC,  poverty  and
unemployment (at least as conventionally measured) are not strongly correlated in LINC. Indeed,
data from the LINC Statistical Bureau (LSB) indicate that unemployment rates rise as income rises
starting from the poorest, then peaking at about the middle of the distribution, and falling thereafter.
13However, there is also thought to be substantial "underemployment" amongst the poorest families
in LINC; a worker might not be classified as unemployed, yet only find work for half the week.
As in MINC, there is no private cost-recovery (C=0) in the LINC scheme.
The wage rate in the LINC scheme is tied to a statutory minimum wage rate for agricultural
labor.  This is unenforceable in LINC, and it is above the prevailing wage rate for casual, unskilled,
agricultural  labor. The Trabajar wage rate in LINC thus attracts participants who are not poor or
unemployed.  Jobs are rationed, and anecdotal evidence from field trips suggests that it is not always
the case that the poor are favored by local administrators of the scheme when deciding who gets
work.  One form of rationing is by only opening the project sites in lean seasons. This helps reduce
the displacement  of other work, and hence forgone income.  So, unlike LINC, there is definite
leakage to the non-poor in LINC, although the forgone income is probably lower than in MINC. I
assume 0.75 for both the targeting performance (W/(W+L))  and the net wage gain (NWIW).'
There are smaller indirect benefits to the poor than in MINC, with non-poor land owners
capturing the benefits from the assets created. However, there are some indirect benefits to the poor,
notably though second-round effects on employment from higher farm productivity.  I assume that
the poor obtain one quarter of the benefits from the project. However, the high labor intensity entails
that the social benefits only sufficient to cover one half of the cost (so B/NW=1.33 in LINC).
On plugging these numbers into equation (1), LINC's value of B/G is almost identical to that
for MINC, and the cost of transferring $1 to the poor is also about $2.50 under LINC's program. As
in MINC, it is unlikely that any of the indirect benefits will entail higher current incomes (within a
few months, say). The current benefit ratio is 0.28 (this is CB/G, as given by the value of B/G when
IB=O). So it costs $3.55 to increase the current earnings of the poor by $1 with LINC's scheme.
Recall that the poverty rate in LINC is 50%. So the absolute gain to the poor from an un-
targeted allocation of the same gross budget is higher than the gain from the Trabajar program.
Table  1 summarizes the cost-effectiveness calculations for these two programs under the
base-case assumptions discussed above. (Costs are rounded off to the nearest $0.10.)
7  This is consistent  with an estimate  of forgone income  in an Indian  workfare  scheme; see Datt
and Ravallion  (1994).
14Table 1: Cost-effectiveness of the two workfare programs under the base-case assumptions
Middle-income  Low-income
country  country
(poverty  rate=20%  (poverty  rate=50%)
Budget leverage:  (G+C)/G  1.0  1.0
Labor intensity:(W+L)/(G+C)  0.33  0.5
Targeting:  W/(W+L)  1.0  0.75
Net wage gain: NW/W  0.6  0.75
Poor peoples' share of total benefits:  IB/SB  0.2  0.25
Benefit/cost  ratio:  SBI(G+C)  1.0  0.5
Current  + future gains to the poor per $ of  0.40  0.41
spending:  B/G
Cost of $1 gain  to the poor  $2.50  $2.50
Current  earnings  gain per $ of program  0.20  0.28
spending:  CBIG
Cost of $1 extra current  earnings  $5.00  $3.60
Comparisons with other safety net operations
One must be cautious in comparing the above estimates with cost-effectiveness ratios for
other schemes. Often these numbers are not strictly comparable with the estimates in Table 1; for
example, the latter include deadweight losses from labor supply effects (which is why NW/W is less
than unity), but these are invariable ignored in other estimates of cost-effectiveness ratios. There are
also systematic differences in the target group; for example, workfare reaches able-bodied adults
while child nutrition programs do not directly do so; rather than choosing between them, both may
be called for.
For cash transfer programs in Eastern Europe, Subbarao et al., (1997, Table 3.5) present
estimates of the proportion of the public transfer going to the poor ranging from 19% to 58%. The
same source (Table 4.2) also gives estimates of the leakage to the non-poor from targeted food
programs for a number of developing countries. The proportion of the total transfer which goes to
the poor ranges from 19% to 93%.  The latter figure is an outlier; excluding it, the range is 19% to
1569%.  For food subsidy programs in India, Radhakrishna et al., (1997) estimate that the share of
expenditure reaching the poor is 16-19%. For housing subsidies, Subbarao et al., (1997, Table 4.5)
quote estimates of the share going to households below median income ranges from 10% to 50%.
It is difficult to generalize from this wide range of experience. But it seems likely that, in
terms of the impact on current incomes from these stylized workfare programs, one could do worse
with other instruments, particularly subsidies to non-inferior goods; but one could probably do better
(or at least no worse) with even an un-targeted lump-sum transfer. Factoring in the estimated future
income  gains to the poor, the workfare schemes start to look better than many other safety net
operations including un-targeted lump-sum transfers in MINC, but not LINC.
Risk benefits
Risk benefits are rarely factored into such cost-effectiveness calculations. How would their
inclusion affect these comparisons? The risk benefits from a good workfare program can be large,
as has often been demonstrated in famines (Ravallion, 1997a, reviews the literature). Even in
"normal" times, existing (market and non-market) arrangements for insurance leave poor people
exposed to uninsured risk. 8 The risk benefits depend on the degree of risk aversion and the effect of
the safety net on the riskiness of incomes, which will depend in turn on how flexibly the program
responds to changing household circumstances. In this respect, some "safety  net" programs are quite
unresponsive, and so ineffective as insurance; ration cards for subsidized foods, for example, are
often held for long periods, and are hard to get quickly. Workfare schemes are more responsive to
income risk provided the work is easily obtained when needed. That will depend on wage rate and
the scheme's budget. If the wage is set so high (given the available budget) that jobs are heavily
rationed then the scheme will not provide reliable insurance for the poor.
This is more of a concern for LINC's  scheme than MINC's. Yet LINC's risk-prone rural
economy is a setting in which one would want the scheme to provide insurance, which is otherwise
difficult for the poor to obtain without high cost (including lost opportunities for escaping poverty
in the longer term through potentially risky investments in human and physical capital).
8  For evidence  on this point, and references  to other literature,  see Jalan  and Ravallion  (1998).
16A full accounting of risk benefits would probably make the MINC scheme look better, but
have less effect on the calculations for LINC.
Options for enhancing program performance
These rapid appraisals also indicate ways in which program performance, in terms of impact
on  poverty  for  a  given  budget  outlay,  might  be  improved.  Box  2  provides  a  checklist  of
recommendations for a cost-effective workfare scheme.
Box 2: What makes a good workfare program?
To realize  the potential  for this class of anti-poverty  interventions  it is recommended  that:
* The wage rate should  be set at a level which is no higher  than the prevailing  market wage for
unskilled  manual labor  in the setting  in which the scheme  is introduced.
* Restrictions  on eligibility  should be avoided;  the fact that one wants work at this wage rate
should ideally  be the only requirement  for eligibility.
* If rationing is required  (because  demand  for work exceeds  the budget  available  at the wage
set) then the program should  be targeted  to poor areas,  as indicated  by a credible  'poverty map".
However,  flexibility  should  be allowed  in future  budget  allocations  across  areas,  to reflect  differences
in demand  for the scheme.
* The labor intensity  (share of wage bill in total cost) should  be higher  than normai for similar
projects in the same  setting. How  much higher  will depend  on the relative  importance  attached  to
immediate  income  gains versus  (income and other) gains  to the poor from the-assets  created.  This will
vary from setting  to setting.
* The projects  should  be targeted  to poor areas,  and try to assure  that the assets created  are of
maximum  value to poor people  in those areas.  Any exceptions  -in  which  the assets largely benefit the
non-poor  - should require  co-financing  from the beneficiaries,  and this money  should go back into the
budget  of the scheme.
* Performance  in reducing  poverty  should  be monitored  using careful evaluations.
The wage rate
The wage rate for the MINC scheme seems about right, but the LfNC wage is too high. A
wage rate no higher than the prevailing market wage rate for unskilled agricultural labor will no
doubt reduce leakage and provide wider coverage of the poor with the current budget, and provide
better insurance. It is implausible that anyone who is willing to do unskilled manual labor for that
wage in LINC is not poor. So (assuming that the other ratios are unchanged), this change in the
LINC program would bring the benefit ratio up to 0.50, and reduce the cost of a $1 gain to the poor
to $2; LINC's workfare program would then do as well as a uniform lump-sum transfer. The current
17benefit ratio (CB/G)  would rise to 0.375-still  less than a lump-sum transfer.
There is likely to be resistance to this reform in LINC, where organized labor will argue that
the government cannot undercut its own statutory minimum wage rate (even though this is not
enforceable  for the poor).  This  was also argued by  labor unions in MINC,  but  the counter
argument-that  an exception should be made for anti-poverty programs-won  the day there.
Cost-recovery
Another way to enhance the scheme's impact on poverty is to introduce cost-recovery  for
the benefits accruing to the non-poor. At a cost-recovery rate of 25%, the value of B/G in MINC
(retaining all other assumption of the base case in Table 1) rises to 0.50, bringing the cost of
transferring  $1 to the poor down to $2.  For LINC we get BIG = 0.45.  At a cost-recovery rate of
50%, the value of BIG in MINC reaches 0.67, bringing the cost of an extra $1 to the poor down to
$1.50. In LINC, a cost-recovery rate of 50% is enough for BIG to reach 0.50. At cost recovery rates
of 75% in MINC and LINC, the cost of transferring $1 to the poor falls to $1 in the former and about
$1.75 in  the latter.  Clearly, cost recovery from non-poor beneficiaries could greatly improve
program performance in both countries.
Labor intensity
A high labor share in outlays can greatly enhance impact on current poverty. Some Trabajar
projects in M[NC have very low labor shares; about one fifth are electricity and gas projects which
have an average labor share of 10%. If these were entirely privately cofinanced then the low labor
share of total cost would not be a concern. More typically, however, such projects would have to
yield  large indirect benefits to the poor to be justified  under the scheme. This seems unlikely.
Estimate by the MINC Ministry of Labor indicate that by dropping these projects, the overall labor
share would be  0.40, implying that B/G=0.44; this alone would mean that it would cost $2.27
(instead of $2.50) to transfer $1 to the poor through the scheme.
Raising the labor share in the MINC program seems an attractive option for improving cost-
effectiveness in transferring money to the poor. Indeed, if the MINC program had the labor intensity
of the LINC program, and all else about the MINC program was the same as in Table 1, then the
value of BIG would rise to 0.50, again bringing the cost of transferring $1 to the poor down to $2.
Recall, however, that there is a trade off between higher labor intensity and the indirect
18benefits from the program in both countries.  As illustrated in Figure  1, a workfare scheme will
operate at labor intensities which entail a trade off between W+L and SB.  So raising the labor
intensity will lower the social benefits. For the sake of argument, suppose that a labor share of two
thirds in MINC was enough to drive the social benefits from the projects down to zero.  Then
B/N W=l. With the other ratios unchanged, the value of B/G would be 0.40, exactly what it is in the
current scheme. So as long as it was possible to cover at least some of the cost of the scheme from
the outputs generated with a labor intensity as high as in LINC, it would be better to switch to a high
labor intensity in the MINC scheme.
So even with a seemingly steep trade off with the indirect benefits, a higher labor intensity
in the MINC program could improve its cost effectiveness in poverty reduction.  Pushing for high
labor intensity in MINC is defensible even when there is a fairly steep trade-off with the indirect
benefits. The case is even stronger when aiming for high current transfer benefits to the poor.
Restrictions on eligibility
The program in MINC imposes various restrictions on the eligibility of participants.  While
some of these may help, others could well diminish the impact on poverty for a given public outlay
on the program. One way they to do this is by adding to the administrative cost. But there are other
ways which may well be important.  The best way to raise the net transfer benefit is to let poor
households re-arrange their own activities optimally, so as to take advantage of access to the scheme.
By adding constraints to the family's own adjustment, the use of extra criteria for eligibility-beyond
the desire to work for this wage-may  actually diminish the net benefits to the poor.
To illustrate, suppose the household head is not unemployed, but is working half time in an
informal sector activity earning half the Trabajar wage.  The spouse has no economic activity, and
could register as unemployed.  If one insists that only the head can join the scheme, and that the
head must be unemployed, then this household will be excluded; net benefit will be zero.  If one
relaxes this restriction entirely then either the spouse will join the scheme, or the head will do so,
leaving the spouse to do the informal sector work if feasible.  If one only partially relaxes the
eligibility  restriction,  by  still  insisting  that  the  participant  is  the  household  head  (whether
unemployed or not), then the outcome will depend on whether the spouse is able to do the informal
sector work; if this is so then the forgone income will be zero; but if the spouse is unable to take up
19that work then the forgone income will be half the Trabajar wage.
Some targeting criteria are less problematic from this point of view.  Insisting  iiiat the
participant's family has young dependents is unlikely to increase forgone income, and will probably
improve targeting performance (on the assumption that larger and younger households tend to be
poorer, ceteris paribus.)  To the extent feasible, insisting that only one worker comes from each
family  should not be a problem, and is certain to be a better way of rationing Trabajar jobs thar
insisting that only the household head can join.
However, one should be careful about applying eligibility criteria. Some may help imprCo.;
the scheme's  performance but others can be counter-productive. The key design feature which
assures that the scheme reaches the poor will be that the wage rate is set at a level which will assure
that  only  the poor  want to participate and that there is wide  coverage amongst them.  Extra
restrictions  on participant  eligibility should only be applied if they help assure better targeting
performance but do not at the same time add to the forgone income of participants.
Design features influencing the indirect benefits to the poor
There are a number of indirect benefits. One is the work experience itself.  The long
unemployed may become so inexperienced that their chances of ever finding work again are
Another indirect benefit is from the assets. This is what I will focus on here.
Field trips to a number of poor areas in both MINC and LINC, and discussions with local
residents, indicated that there was plenty of scope for worthwhile community infrastructure projects
in poor areas. Quantitative estimates of the potential economic benefits from such projects would
be difficult to establish within a short time horizon. However, I do not think it unreasonable to
expect larger net (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) benefits to poor people from such projects than the
current schemes are achieving.
To illustrate the implications for the cost-effectiveness calculations, suppose that the value
of the indirect benefits to poor communities from the projects in MINC rose to one half of the total
benefits.  Keeping all other assumptions the same, B/NW would rise to 2.25, and the overall B/G
ratio would rise to 0.70. Thus the cost of transferring $1 to the poor would fall by over 40%-from
$2.50 to about $1.40. Under the same assumption, the cost of transferring $1 of to the poor in LINC
would fall to $1.90. If at the same time, the social benefits could be increased to cover three-quarters
20of the cost (still a benefit-to-cost ratio under one) then the cost of a $1 gain to the poor in LINC
would fall to about $1.50.
Borrowing an idea that has been popular in a number of Social Funds, a points system can
be used in project selection to assure that the projects are of value to poor people. The points system
should give a large premium to projects located  in poor areas. Care should be taken to assure that
the selected areas are in fact poor by verifiable criteria. Imperfect census-based poverty  indicators
are available at local level in both countries.  When good additional evidence can be provided (on
an ad hoc basis) that a specific community is usually poor relative to others in its municipality or
department then this should also be rewarded by extra points. Objective criteria for such ad hoc
information should be established with clear responsibility for verification.  The points system can
also be used to give an incentive to municipal governments in non-poor areas who are willing to
cofinance projects in bona fide poor areas. Extra points could be given when co-financing is offered
by private residents of non-poor areas. The points system can also reward technical corroboration
of the project's viability; is it likely to work on purely technical, engineering, grounds? One can give
extra points for a letter of recommendation from an engineer qualified to assess the technical merit.
A high premium should be attached to any proposal which is likely to yield sizable external
benefits within poor communities. Here direct local (community) level involvement in the proposed
project  should be used, both  as an indicator of longer term sustainability and  as a  source of
information on possible external benefits within the local area, or beyond.  If a bona fide local
community group (such as the local women's association) says that it would be a valuable project
(aside from the direct employment benefits) then extra points should be allocated.
Any technically viable project in a community which is poor by national standards, and in
which local community groups back the project, should qualify for the minimum points needed for
selection, subject to the availability of funds. Amongst all projects which also qualify, the ranking
can be by the number of points.
There are other design features which can enhance the value of the assets created.  Relying
as far as possible on workers from the same community will probably enhance the quality of the
work done, by giving them a personal longer-term interest.  Making final payment (or a bonus)
contingent on successful completion to a standard which can be verified ex post would also help.
21In both MINC and LINC, the center must also rely on the existing fiscal federalism. There
are likely to be systematic factors influencing how well some provinces can reach their poor areas;
for example, it is not implausible that provinces which are poorer on average will have a harder time
targeting  their poor areas (Ravallion,  1997b). Central incentives to  improve performance, and
targeted technical assistance in proposing viable sub-projects at local level, could no doubt help.
Progress in reaching poor areas with the projects is not difficult to monitor, though this will be easier
in MINC where the statistical system is better developed, with much more extensive computerization
than in LINC. When a points system is used and both project selection and the budget allocation are
geographically decentralized, a check should be made for horizontal inequality between areas in the
number of points received by the last project accepted. Reallocations of the budget may then be
called for. A good information system for project monitoring can help greatly in all the respects.
Conclusions
This article has offered rapid appraisals of two workfare program, one  in a middle-income
country, the other in a low-income country. The programs are stylized versions of those found in
practice. The cost of a $1 gain to the poor using the program is reckoned to be about $2.50 in both
cases, though the components of that cost are quite different, with higher gains in current earnings
of the poor from the scheme in the low-income country, reflecting its higher labor intensity.  The
costs of a $1 gain in current earnings are $5 and $3.50 for the middle and low-income countries
respectively. The amount received by the poor from a given public outlay under the program is
double what they would expect from a uniform (un-targeted) transfer in the middle income county.
However, such a lump-sum transfer would do better than workfare in the low income country.
Comparisons  with cost-effectiveness ratios for other types of safety net operations suggest that
workfare  schemes would  dominate some  options,  notably poorly  targeted  food and  housing
subsidies,  but not others. These comparisons may, however, be deceptive; the same costs are not
always considered, and the same options are not always feasible.
In both countries, reforms to the scheme could enhance performance in reaching the poor.
It should be possible to improve cost effectiveness  by switching  to more labor intensive production
methods for the sub-projects in the middle income country. There is also scope in both countries for
22; ncing  the indirect benefits within poor communities from the assets created. Redistributive co-
fi1nancing  - whereby cost recovery is only applied to asset creation in non-poor areas - could also
greatly improve cost-effectiveness, even with only partial cost recovery.
There are likely to be trade offs between some of these options for improving the scheme's
impact on poverty. In particular, too high a labor intensity will mean that the projects yield negligible
indirect benefits. Circumstances will no doubt influence the choices made with respect to such a
trade off. In a crisis situation in which rapid current gains are called for, it is understandable that the
program will opt for high labor intensity. In more normal times, where political sustainability of the
safety net is also an issue, indirect benefits will tend to get greater weight.
The present calculations suggest that by any one of these route - greater cost-recovery from
-ie non-poor, higher labor intensity, or greater indirect benefits to the poor - or some combination,
design changes should make it possible to appreciably enhance the poverty impact for a given outlay.
It cannot be denied that these calculations are rough. Naturally, the more rapid the appraisal,
the more assumptions will be needed to make up for missing data. The type of appraisal described
above is no substitute for rigorous evaluations. But it can still help inform public choice and program
design. It can also help identify key areas where further data and analysis would have a high return.
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